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美国对华卡客车双反案中国胜诉

全面制裁中国:2018美国家经济与安全审查委员会报告向国会提出26条建议

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在刚刚结束的美国对华卡客车轮胎双反案投票中,美国国际贸易委员会共5名委员投票,三名委员认定不存在实质性损害及损害威胁,两名委员认定存在实质性损害,ITC(美国国际贸易委员会)作出最终裁决,认定从中国进口的卡客车轮胎未损害美国企业利益!裁决结果意味着不会对中国产品征税,已经征收的保证金将全额退还。我方完胜!感谢为之拼搏奋斗的中国橡胶业界同仁!

本文首发于Survival: Global Politics and Strategy杂志2013年6-7月刊,网址参见

博士陈

写完白宫幕僚专栏及其各自所把持的部门之后,笔者最近比较关注美中经济与安全审查委员会,发现它就像是美国处理与中国关系的一个中央处理器。

以下为美国ITC网站原图:

Chinese officials and analysts regard the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, despite Washington’s claim that it does not focus on a particular country. Instead of accepting either Chinese skepticism or US official statements at face value, this article attempts to trace the origins and examine the evolution of the pivot through the lens of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, the Office of Net Assessment .Drawing on documents produced and sponsored by the office, this article explores trends in its analysis of Asian security and Sino-American relations, the rationale for the pivot and China’s role in the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.Established in 1973, the ONA is directed by Andrew W. Marshall and employs around 15 staff.1 Most of its projects are outsourced to external academics, think tanks and companies. The US Department of Defense defines net assessment as ‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.’2 The ONA studies issues relevant to national security such as weapons technology and climate change, explores worst-case scenarios and promotes no-regret strategies. 3 Using methods such as war games, simulations, policy analysis and scenario-based planning, the office aims to anticipate strategic developments 20 years in advance.Marshall was described by former US Vice President Dick Cheney as one of the world’s best strategists, and last year was ranked at number 44 in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.4 Like many first-generation RAND scholars, Marshall is often praised for his originality, though he has also been criticised for making exaggerated claims.This article is based on the study of ONA-related defence department documents and memoranda, the writings of officials and experts associated with the office and work by individuals and organisations it commissioned to carry out research. For brevity, I will not specify every aspect of the ONA’s relationship with the individuals and organisations quoted in this article. Generally, these sources influenced, or were influenced by, Marshall and the ONA. Those associated with the ONA will usually be referred to as net assessors. Although Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999 seemingly has no connection to the office, Marshall and Albert Wohlstetter were consulted on the drafting of the document.5 Zalmay Khalilzad and Abram N. Shulsky, major authors of the guidance, both have a background at RAND and are closely associated with Marshall and Wohlstetter. Shulsky also worked for the ONA, and was one of the participants in its 1999 Summer Study. This article examines ONA-related work since the 1980s.I recognise the limitations of this approach. Firstly, there is no discussion of the degree to which US national-security policy has in fact been influenced by the office and the studies it sponsored. Secondly, some may categorise the ONA and its associated net assessors as neoconservatives, and argue that my sources reveal only certain neoconservative perspectives. However, instead of discussing ideology, this study treats the office as a channel through which experts from academic, non-governmental institutions influence national-security decision-making at the highest level. The underlying assumption is that examining ONA-related work will help us understand the world views of senior US officials and defence elites or, at least, tell us what interests the Pentagon’s internal think tank and, to some extent, the Defense Department. There is also an assumption that it will tell us what questions they asked at certain points in time and reveal, to a degree, the rationale for the pivot. In any case, if US officials and elites’ views of the security environment and the pivot are to be assessed, ONArelated work appears a good place to begin.Cold War originsAs shown by various high-level strategy and national-security documents, the ONA’s work during the Cold War led to net assessment becoming the United States’ main analytical framework for understanding the global security environment and the competition with the USSR. The White House’s 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States argued thatthe United States must pursue strategies for competition with the Soviets which emphasize our comparative advantages … Competitive strategies are aimed at exploiting our technological advantages in thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of military application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine obsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not necessarily threaten our own forces.6Some scholars and former officials argued that the ONA, alongside the Competitive Strategies Initiative created by Marshall, helped to perfect the containment strategy that contributed to the collapse of the USSR.7 As argued by Daniel I. Gouré, vice-president of the Lexington Institute, ‘the competitive strategies approach, particularly as applied by the Reagan administration, did much to set the stage for subsequent events and for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact’.8The ONA continues to play an influential role in strategic assessment and defence planning. It is responsible for preparing the US defence secretary’s annual report to Congress, which contains a comprehensive net assessment ‘to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries’.9 The ONA’s work on the well-known concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs has influenced strategists in many countries. The office is often involved in drafting and assessing national-security and defence-policy documents.Many former ONA staff have held high-ranking positions at the Pentagon, think tanks, consulting companies, universities or military education centres. Taiwan and India have established their own offices of net assessment and the approach has heavily influenced Australian defence policy. According to Chen Zhou, the main author of four recent Chinese defence white papers, the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science also studies Marshall’s work.10From its inception to around 2000, the ONA went through roughly three phases in assessing the global security environment and identifying potential challenges. Firstly, during the Cold War, it focused on long-term competition with the USSR. Secondly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, it worked to find the right direction for strategic orientation. Finally, from the mid-1990s to around 2000, the office began to fully realise the strategic importance of Asia and assess potential great-power competitors in the region. At the end of this phase, the office concluded that China would be the United States’ main strategic competitor in the next few decades.During the ONA’s first phase of assessment, Asia was treated as a key balance area but regarded as being much less important than Europe. China appeared in its studies only on occasion and, when it did, was viewed in terms of its importance to competition with the USSR.11 In the mid-1980s, the ONA recognised that Asia was becoming more important. Drawing on a 1983 strategic-balance review, Marshall concluded that the United States was in a strong position and the Soviets’ capacity to wage global war was diminishing.12 This allowed the ONA to divert some of its resources to studying future security scenarios, such as the rise of Asia and the development of a multipolar world order. Consequently, in 1985 the office requested that the Science Applications International Corporation begin to study potential strategies and policies for use in such scenarios.13 The main findings of these studies were reflected in The Future Security Environment, a 1988 report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, led by Marshall and Charles Wolf, Jr, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. This report accurately identified several long-term trends, two of which are still highly relevant to the United States’ current strategic thinking and pivot towards Asia.Firstly, the paper argued that the Soviets were correct in thinking technological development would lead to new forms of military organization and operational concepts that would fundamentally change the nature of warfare. Secondly, Marshall and Wolf predicted that the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries would increase their military spending, shifting the balance of power in a way that could affect US security.14 Although the USSR was still at the centre of ONA studies and US strategic planning at the time, the report noted that a multipolar world order was emerging and Asia was becoming increasingly important. The ONA’s recognition of such changes is also evident in subsequent studies, such as Multipolarity in the Pacific by 2010: A Geopolitical Simulation and An Examination of the Implications of Multi-Polarity in Strategy and Force Structure.15Redefining strategic objectivesAlthough the ONA recognised the emergence of a multipolar world order in the 1980s, it was the great changes caused by the end of the Cold War that led it to drastically reassess prevailing ideas about national interests and strategies. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, net assessors acknowledged that the United States was not directly threatened and no longer had a peer competitor. As a 1994 ONA-sponsored study pointed out, ‘current U.S. statements of objectives and strategy are either overly specific or vague because they are in transition from the well-defined problems of the Cold War to a new, relatively undefined set of problems’.16 According to the 1993–99 US National Security Surveys, ‘a primary characteristic of the Cold War was that it really was very stable … It provided a beacon for orientation. There is no beacon right now.’17The ONA’s search for such a beacon led to the redefined strategic objectives and conception of global security proposed in Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999. Written by, among others, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, later Cheney’s chief of staff, under the supervision of future US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the document discussed the United States’ new position as the world’s only superpower. It also reviewed other nations’ capacity to develop strategic aims and defence postures to challenge this status. The plan clearly defined new strategic objectives as preventing ‘the re-emergence of a new rival for world power’ and addressing ‘sources of regional conflict and instability’ that could unsettle international relations by threatening the interests of the United States or its allies.18Despite its aims, the study neither identified the United States’ regional focus nor its potential rivals. It suggested that the main US objective in Asia was ‘to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon’.19 While it supported European integration, a Europe that excluded the United States was judged to be unacceptable. The study also presented India as a potential regional hegemon, recommending that the United States ‘discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean’.20The ONA worked to identify potential threats and adversaries throughout the early 1990s but there is no evidence that it focused on a specific region or adversary until the middle of the decade. In 1992 Marshall instructed his military assistant Andrew F. Krepinevich to assess other nations’ potential to initiate an RMA. Krepinevich compared the global security environment of the time with that of the early 1920s in the belief that no major enemy had emerged. His report intended to identify the most important actors in the following two decades but concluded that the most capable potential rivals were US allies, who had no strong incentive to compete. (Russia had an incentive to compete but was in no position to do so.)ONA-sponsored studies conducted in the mid-1990s such as Research Design for Asia Force Assessment and Asian Security Challenges: Planning in the Face of Strategic Uncertainties revealed Asia’s enormous strategic and economic significance. Unlike The Future Security Environment, which suggested the region’s relative importance would moderately increase, these studies argued that it would become more important than Europe in subsequent decades. From 1993–98, the ONA conducted various RMA-oriented war games, workshops, roundtables and seminars. East Asia dominated its regional studies. Among the 13 papers the office produced in this period, three focused on China, six on Korean unification and one on wider Asia.21 Asia 2025, which was published in 1999, succinctly explained the reason for this change: ‘most US military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital US interests. The threats are in Asia.’22Peer competitorsThe ONA’s advocacy of a shift of attention from Europe to Asia was based on the assumption that a peer competitor to the United States would eventually emerge from the East.23 Asian Security Challenges envisioned four distinct versions of the future security environment in the region, including a scenario in which ‘the major challenge to U.S. security interests came from the regional hegemonic ambitions of one or more large Asian states: China, Russia, Japan or India.’24During the latter half of the decade, the ONA conducted many in-depth assessments of these countries to identify which was most likely to become a peer competitor. It analysed their strategic objectives, wider aims, willingness to challenge US supremacy and long-term trends in economics, demography and military capability. It also undertook various projects to assess the future balance of power in Asia by comparing Asian countries’ efforts and abilities to create and adapt to new military technologies.25 Marshall was one of the few defence analysts to recognise China’s economic potential in the 1980s: he predicted the country would develop the world’s largest economy in 25–30 years. In 1994 Marshall argued that ‘there may be six or eight major powers, but the two that have the biggest chance of becoming major competitors are a revived Russia that partially reconstructs its empire, and China.’26 Marshall’s net assessors did continue to study other scenarios. This was in line with his oft-repeated lesson to ONA staff: ‘don’t try to make your best guess. Don’t try to say, this is what’s going to happen, I’m pretty sure, and then suppress dissent, suppress other scenarios that might unfold, or imply that you sort of have a know-it-all attitude.’27In the early 1990s, for example, many net assessors judged that Japan’s economic power and technological development made it a promising candidate to initiate a future RMA and challenge the United States. Asian Security Challenges argued thatJapan’s technology, manufacturing capabilities, manpower skills, communications, and transportation nets would enable it to make a major increase in its military capabilities, if it decided to do so and was able to overcome the domestic political barriers to becoming a military power ... Japan has the resources to become the dominant military power in Asia and even to become a global military power.28The 1991 study Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy points out that ‘Asian leaders – notably in Japan – resented the notion that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a broadly defined Western world (including the advanced economies of Asia)’.29 However, Japan’s Potential Role in a Military-Technical Revolution, published later that year, concluded that the country showed no interest in re-militarisation: ‘Two strong impressions came out of interviews. First, the pacifist sentiment in Japan was even stronger than we had imagined from our previous readings and experience. Second, tactical-technical innovation is weak and, as far as we could discover, almost non-existent.’30 Moreover, the stagnation of the Japanese economy made it unlikely that Japan would become a peer competitor.During this period, net assessors maintained that Russia’s military capability, notwithstanding formidable weapons systems and advanced technological expertise, was being severely eroded by economic difficulties and a demographic crisis. Moscow’s defence budget was rapidly diminishing; the Russian state had ‘consistently had problems meeting budget commitments due to tax shortfalls’. The country’s negative population growth had reduced its military-age population.31 This demographic crisis was serious enough that, from the mid-1990s, net assessors grew concerned that China might exploit it by populating Russia’s eastern territories or invading Siberia.32 They also argued that Russia’s sophisticated research and development infrastructure would be undercut by long-term economic decline.The ONA identified China rather than India as the United States’ principle adversary for several reasons. Firstly, it seems net assessors could not agree whether India should be considered as a potential niche competitor or peer competitor.33 The key difference between these categories is that niche competitors do not threaten the United States’ vital interests, while peer competitors have the potential to challenge its global dominance. Secondly, even if both countries were considered to be potential peer competitors, China would rise more quickly in the short term. Published in 1996, the ONAsponsored study China and India, 2025: A Comparative Assessment concluded that China had more potential for growth before 2025, but India was likely to become more powerful thereafter.34 One scenario explored in Asia 2025 suggested that the United States needed to establish ‘a working strategic dialogue and common geopolitical objectives with one of them, and India appears to be the more logical choice’.35 In April 2000, Marshall suggested this strategy to Donald Rumsfeld, who would be appointed US defence secretary in January 2001, arguing that the United States needed to ‘get interested in India and Australia, and develop better relationships’.36 Marshall confirmed his support for this approach in a discussion about the creation of an Asian equivalent to NATO with high-level Indian civilian advisers in 2003.37China as the principle competitorThe ONA judged China to be the United States’ main competitor by assessing its capabilities and intentions, which it continues to carefully monitor. A large population with a relatively high literacy rate provides China with the skilled labour necessary for military modernisation and an RMA. The percentage of China’s population at working age will be higher than that of India until 2030, when the trend reverses.38 Marshall started thinking about China as a potential threat to American primacy when its economy, which has been growing rapidly since 1978, was smaller than that of Italy. He suggested that its rapid economic expansion would allow it to increase its military capability and diplomatic influence in Asia and other regions, such as Africa and Latin America.China’s military is larger, and being modernised more quickly, than that of any other Asian country. The Americans feared that its growing anti-access and area-denial capabilities would enable it to coerce its neighbours and gradually displace US influence in the region. In the mid-1990s, China’s economic development allowed it to significantly increase defence spending and modernisation programmes, and to initiate an RMA. Since then, Marshall has commissioned studies on the country’s military development, power-projection capabilities, changes to its operational doctrine, perception of the future security environment, approach to warfare and RMA.39 In the 1994 China in the Near Term, net assessors contended that the 1991 US invasion of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm fundamentally altered Chinese perceptions of future warfare and fuelled the PLA’s modernisation efforts.40 In 2005 the late Mary C. FitzGerald, research fellow at the Hudson Institute, warned that China had moved towards an RMA by developing weaponry and improving its military theory, organisation, education and training.41She argued thatinformation, naval and, above all, aerospace [capabilities] still constitute the nucleus of the new revolution in military affairs. If we neglect the timely development of weaponry in these arenas, then China could catch America like a deer in the proverbial headlights, precisely where we caught them after the 1991 victory in Desert Storm.42During the 1990s, the balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific gradually shifted to benefit China. The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation considerably eased Sino-Russian territorial disputes and allowed China to focus on other contended areas, such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In response to the PLA’s demonstration of force in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States assisted Taiwan by providing it with analytical training through the ONA and helping it to develop its defence capabilities.43In 2000 Marshall argued that ‘the PRC is ambitious. Its goal is to be a great power.’44 Such a view was also evident in China in the Near Term, which concluded that China’s long-term strategic goal was to develop a military that rivalled the United States globally.45 The report argued that China was dissatisfied with the US-dominated world order and its foreign policies were ‘independent of and sometimes opposed to U.S. policies’, which created ‘the potential for China directly to challenge U.S. security interests’.46 The Pentagon-sponsored The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications, published in 1999, used realist theory and an analysis of Chinese history to argue that China would seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific as its power grew.47 As FitzGerald put it in 2005, ‘China’s ultimate objective is to achieve global military-economic dominance by 2050’.48Marshall laid out the blueprint for the pivot in a memo to Rumsfeld in May 2002:Australia: start negotiations to base selected US forces in Australian Northern Territories and expand US and regional states’ use of Australian training ranges … India: increase port visits, and initiate program of mil-to-mil interactions; initiate joint planning for contingency of loss of control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan … Initiate planning for a major expansion of basing infrastructure in Guam, and possible improvement in Pearl Harbor infrastructure … Direct the Services to plan for the types of military challenges a malevolent China may pose over the long-term, and incorporate these into Service and Joint war games, training and exercise programs, including routine wide-area USN–USAF–special forces exercises … For next UCP change , redraw CENTCOM/PACOM boundaries to reflect China as principle long-term strategic competitor.49The memo makes clear that despite China’s comparative lack of development in many areas, the ONA had identified it as the biggest threat to US primacy over the next few decades. As Aaron L. Friedberg, professor at Princeton University, has argued, ‘China today appears to have both the “will” and the “wallet” to compete actively with the United States for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world’.50Preserving US primacy through competition with ChinaNet assessors usually suggest that the United States has three ways to meet the challenges of a rising China.51 It could either forego its current primacy by reducing its global presence and reverting to isolationism, create a multipolar world order in which other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their regions or preserve its current position by limiting China’s growing power and influence.52Several ONA studies in the early 2000s addressed the difficulties of preserving or extending US primacy.53 Although net assessors acknowledge that the United States’ relative power will decline in coming decades, they often argue that it can preserve its current role. In the face of challenges from emerging powers, history suggests that a dominant state can preserve or strengthen its primacy. Friedberg has argued that the United States may be able to maintain its position for at least a few decades.54 The 2002 ONA paper Military Advantage in History uses case studies of dominant ancient powers to argue that superior armed forces are vital to the preservation of great power status:The Roman model suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop countercapabilities. Transformation coupled with strong strategic institutions is a powerful combination for an adversary to overcome.55The paper therefore suggests that the United States needed to initiate an RMA to adapt to the changing security environment, especially the asymmetric challenges posed by China.Having confirmed that maintaining US primacy was possible, Marshall devised a strategy for competing with China that focused on dissuasion, deterrence and defeat. This approach was officially introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and reiterated in later documents. The strategy accords with Marshall’s view that ‘any adequate balance assessment requires evaluation from at least three perspectives: deterrence, likely war outcomes, and long-term competition in peacetime’.56Dissuasion, deterrence and defeatNet assessors argue that dissuasion is crucial to long-term peacetime competition. Marshall suggests the United States’ strategic goal ‘should be to delay the emergence of hostile and competent competitors’.57 This objective could be achieved by dissuading China from further developing its military or expanding globally. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report proposed thatthrough its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.58Although the concept of dissuasion was only officially introduced in 2001, the ONA has studied the idea for much longer. In 1992 Krepinevich stated ‘there are ways in which the United States could shape the competition, or dissuade or deter competitors’.59 Today, dissuasion and deterrence appear to be very similar. Dissuasion Strategy, a 2008 study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, defined dissuasion as ‘pre-deterrence’ or ‘actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated costs and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the US perspective’.60 Stephen P. Rosen, professor at Harvard University, has explained the logic of long-term peaceful competition:By understanding the fears and sensitivities of an adversary, programs could be initiated or reinforced in ways that reduced the confidence of the adversary in his ability to win an engagement or a war. This could enhance deterrence, and also lead the adversary to cease its efforts even to compete with the United States in certain areas.61The United States may dissuade potential competitors by occasionally demonstrating its military capabilities and willingness to enter into a conflict, but dissuasion is a very delicate matter. An excessive demonstration of force and willingness to fight could prompt greater Chinese assertiveness。This suggests that to determine the correct use of the strategy, the Pentagon will closely monitor China’s perception of, and responses to, dissuasive action. The success of such a strategy depends more on the Chinese reaction to dissuasive demonstrations of power than the actual capabilities of US forces. Where China’s view of US military superiority has made it less likely to develop capabilities to challenge the United States, dissuasion has succeeded. This recognition of the importance of perceptions has led to many studies of human cognition, the biological mechanisms of decision-making and Chinese culture, strategic traditions and leadership ideology.62In the last 10–15 years, the ONA has focused on strategic dissuasion. The office views China’s development of capabilities as being in its early stages, but having great potential to challenge US primacy in the long term. The ONA also concludes that, should both dissuasion and deterrence fail, the United States must be prepared to defeat China. The likely outcomes of such a conflict, and whether it would serve US interests in the long term, are unclear. The ONA’s usual method of gathering experts from relevant areas to create a range of plausible scenarios is insufficient for predicting how a war between the United States and China would play out, even in terms of assessing the likelihood of achieving military objectives. Qualitative factors, such as doctrine and operational concepts, are vital to determining the results of such a war. The development of new weapons technologies and operational concepts could serve the strategies of dissuasion, deterrence and defeat because it may enable the United States to prevail in future conflicts and discourage potential adversaries from attacking US interests.63Assessing ChinaSince 2000, the ONA appears to have made significant progress in creating strategies for long-term competition with China. As the office increased its efforts to understand the long-term consequences of China’s rise, it undertook a series of analyses of the country’s economy; military capabilities and modernisation; potential economic and political influence in the region and perception of the security environment.64 The ONA often conducted war games designed to assess how US and Chinese forces might interact, including through the office’s annual summer studies programme at the US Naval War College.During this period, many other US organisations, especially ONArelated think tanks, worked to assess China. Analytical tools developed by the office were often used to simulate Sino-American conflicts.65 In recent years, the ONA has organised many seminars and workshops on net assessment, competitive strategies and case studies focusing on China, including a 2010 conference that produced the book Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Such developments suggest the office has accepted the United States will enter into long-term competition with China, and has made the application of Cold War analytical and strategic methods central to its work. It is likely that the ONA seeks to identify China’s strengths and weaknesses, how to best use US power against Chinese vulnerabilities and the forms of competition that most favour the United States. For example, if the office judges that China fears containment, it may formulate strategies to exploit this perception.* * *A study of the ONA’s work suggests that the United States’ pivot towards Asia has been a gradual process. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the office’s progressive shift of focus from the Soviet Union to competition with China was based on long-term assessments of the security environment and the development of potential emerging powers. It also suggests that the Pentagon began a detailed assessment of Chinese strengths and weaknesses in the early 2000s. In recent years, ONA studies have attempted to outline a strategy to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities and compete in areas in which the United States is strong, with the goal of preserving US primacy. If the office’s work anticipates US strategy in Asia, the United States may demonstrate its power in highly selective ways that aim to dissuade China from challenging its dominance. It is likely that Cold War competitive strategies will be a significant part of the Pentagon’s approach to China in coming decades.Notes

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它们每年都会出一个年报,从2002年至今,一年比一年厚,能感受到话语体系的变化。

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[责任编辑:诺方知远]

写完白宫幕僚专栏及其各自所把持的部门之后,笔者最近比较关注美中经济与安全审查委员会,发现它就像是美国处理与中国关系的一个中央处理器。

在2007年的报告中,笔者发现它就引用了纳瓦罗的研究成果,指出中国不公平竞争的5大武器,包括货币贬值、盗窃知识产权、环保条例比较宽松、出口补贴等,也指出了中国没有遵守WTO规则。

美国对华卡客车双反案中国胜诉

欢迎订阅知远防务快讯 我们在第一时间报导全球最新防务动态,关注世界热点事件,追踪防务发展方向。

它们每年都会出一个年报,从2002年至今,一年比一年厚,能感受到话语体系的变化。

它们每年都会给国会提几十条建议,建议其给各个部门分配任务,调查相关问题。从现在的美国政策来看,多少都有体现。

以下为全文:

在2007年的报告中,笔者发现它就引用了纳瓦罗的研究成果,指出中国不公平竞争的5大武器,包括货币贬值、盗窃知识产权、环保条例比较宽松、出口补贴等,也指出了中国没有遵守WTO规则。

本文是2018年年报,发表于2018年11月14日,分4章,共11个部分,全面评估了中美经济、贸易、国家安全、军事等方面的关系,还评估了中国与美国盟友、中国与亚太国家、中国与台湾地区、中国与香港地区的关系,同时还有对中国国内推行的“一带一路”等计划的评估。

WASHINGTON (Feb. 22, 2017) — By a 3-2 vote, the U.S. International Trade Commission has made a negative determination on whether the domestic truck and bus tire industry has suffered MATerial injury beCAuse of Chinese imports.

它们每年都会给国会提几十条建议,建议其给各个部门分配任务,调查相关问题。从现在的美国政策来看,多少都有体现。

在此基础上,它像国会提出了26条建议,建议国会指示或授权各部门之间加强协调,或开展某些新的评估项目,这些都是下一步工作的重点。

The ITC vote means that the U.S. Department of Commerce will not order U.S. Customs and Border Protection to collect antidumping and countervailing duties from Chinese truck and bus tire manufacturers and importers.

本文是2018年年报,发表于2018年11月14日,分4章,共11个部分,全面评估了中美经济、贸易、国家安全、军事等方面的关系,还评估了中国与美国盟友、中国与亚太国家、中国与台湾地区、中国与香港地区的关系,同时还有对中国国内推行的“一带一路”等计划的评估。

读2018年的报告,再配合中兴、晋华、华为等事件,心中非常不安,一方面用词非常“狠”,另一方面对技术,特别是5G、通信和物联网技术,要全面压制中国。

ITC Vice Chairman David B. Johanson and Commissioners Meredith M. BroADBEnt and F. Scott Kieff voted against a finding of material injury, whereas Chairman Rhonda K. Schmidtlein and Commissioner Irving A. Williamson voted in the affirmative. Commissioner Dean A. PiNKErt did not participate in the vote.

在此基础上,它像国会提出了26条建议,建议国会指示或授权各部门之间加强协调,或开展某些新的评估项目,这些都是下一步工作的重点。

所以,制裁可能仍在路上。

The United Steelworkers union petitioned the ITC in January 2016, requesting antidumping and countervailing duty relief protection from Chinese truck and bus tire imports under Sections 701 and 731 of the Trade Act.

读2018年的报告,再配合中兴、晋华、华为等事件,心中非常不安,一方面用词非常“狠”,另一方面对技术,特别是5G、通信和物联网技术,要全面压制中国。

考虑到很少有读者能够耐心的读完这539页的英文报告,笔者将最核心的“建议”部分翻译总结如下,共各位读者参考(报告有个总结部分,可以去官网下载,地址:

The ITC made a preliminary determination of material injury in March, and the Commerce Department issued final antidumping duties against Chinese tire makers ranging from 9 to 22.57 percent on Jan. 23.

所以,制裁可能仍在路上。

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

On the same day, Commerce levied final countervailing duties ranging from 38.61 to 65.46 percent. On Feb. 14, after reviewing its calculations, the agency lowered the countervailing duties against Double Coin HoldinGS Ltd. to 20.98 from 38.61 percent. The duties against Guizhou Tyre Co. Ltd. were lowered slightly, to 63.34 from 65.46 percent.

考虑到很少有读者能够耐心的读完这539页的英文报告,笔者将最核心的“建议”部分翻译总结如下,共各位读者参考(报告有个总结部分,可以去官网下载,地址:

美中经济与贸易关系

Cooper Tire &Rubber Co., which manufactures all its truck and bus tires in China, approved the decision.

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

Section 2: Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges

“Cooper supports free and fair trade, and we are pleased with the ITC’s determination,” the tire maker said.

美中经济与贸易关系

处理美中经济挑战的工具

Walter Weller, senior vice president, strategic accounts at China Manufacturers Alliance L.L.C. , also said he was pleased with the ITC’s decision. CMA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Double Coin and the domestic DIStributor of Double Coin tires.

Section 2: Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges

The Commission recommends:

“Anybody considering all the facts, including the record profits for American manufacturers and their inability to even come close to satisfying domestic truck and bus tire demand, would have to conclude that this was the right thing to do,” Mr. Weller said.

处理美中经济挑战的工具

委员会建议

USW International President Leo W. Gerard condemned the decision.

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress examine whether the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative should bring, in coordination with U.S. alliesand partners, a “non-violation nullification or impairment” case—alongside violationsof specific commitments—against China at the World Trade Organization underArticle 23 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

“The ITC commissioners made a huge mistake,” Mr. Gerard said in a press release. “While the Department of Commerce identified subsidies of up to more than 60 percent and dumping of up to almost 23 percent, the ITC failed to support relief for the injured workers.

委员会建议

美国国会评估美国贸易代表办公室是否应与美国的盟友和伙伴协调,根据世界贸易组织《关税及贸易总协定》第23条,对中国采取“不违反规定的撤销或损害”措施,并考察其是否违反某项具体承诺。

“That simply ignores the facts and the harm that Chinese unfairly traded exports have caused the workers,” he said.

  1. Congress examine whether the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative should bring, in coordination with U.S. alliesand partners, a “non-violation nullification or impairment” case—alongside violationsof specific commitments—against China at the World Trade Organization underArticle 23 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
  1. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to identify the trade-distorting practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and develop policies to counteract theiranticompetitive impact.

Other recent USW petitions to the ITC met with more success.

美国国会评估美国贸易代表办公室是否应与美国的盟友和伙伴协调,根据世界贸易组织《关税及贸易总协定》第23条,对中国采取“不违反规定的撤销或损害”措施,并考察其是否违反某项具体承诺。

美国国会指示美国贸易代表办公室查明中国国有企业扭曲贸易的行为,并制定政策抵消这些行为的反竞争影响。

In July 2015, the ITC voted 3-3 to find that Chinese passenger and light truck tire imports were causing material injury to the U.S. passenger and light truck tire industry. Commerce assessed countervailing duties ranging from 20.73 to 100.77 percent, and antidumping duties of 14.35 to 87.99 percent.

  1. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to identify the trade-distorting practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and develop policies to counteract theiranticompetitive impact.
  1. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives in technical cooperation. This assessment should describe thenature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on theoutcomes; detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which theinitiatives occur; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S.researchers and companies are being adequately protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises or the military are benefitting from U.S.taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any Chinese researchers participating inthe collaboration have ties to the Chinese government or military; investigateif any U.S. companies, universities, or labs participating in U.S. government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetration originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for theUnited States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any,among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.

On Feb. 3, the ITC voted 5-0 to find that Indian and Sri Lankan off-the-road tire imports were causing material injury to the U.S. OTR tire industry.

美国国会指示美国贸易代表办公室查明中国国有企业扭曲贸易的行为,并制定政策抵消这些行为的反竞争影响。

国会指示政府问责局(Government Accountability Office)对中美技术合作的合作倡议进行评估。该评估应描述合作的性质,包括资助、参与者以及结果;详述有关措施所依据的许可及规管制度;考虑美国研究人员和公司的知识产权是否得到充分保护;研究中国国有企业或军队是否从美国纳税人资助的研究中受益;调查参与合作的中国研究人员是否与中国政府或军方有联系;调查参与美国政府主导的美中合作项目的任何美国公司、大学或实验室是否受到源自中国的网络渗透;并评估这种合作对美国的好处。此外,这一评估还应调查由政府主导的美中合作项目是否存在浪费现象,如果有的话,并提出改进合作的建议。

The USW and Titan Tire Corp. were the petitioners. Countervailing duties levied in that case ranged from 2.18 to 5.38 percent. No antidumping duties were levied.

  1. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives in technical cooperation. This assessment should describe thenature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on theoutcomes; detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which theinitiatives occur; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S.researchers and companies are being adequately protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises or the military are benefitting from U.S.taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any Chinese researchers participating inthe collaboration have ties to the Chinese government or military; investigateif any U.S. companies, universities, or labs participating in U.S. government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetration originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for theUnited States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any,among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.

Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation.

The ITC’s report on the Chinese truck and bus tire investigation will be posted online by March 15.

国会指示政府问责局(Government Accountability Office)对中美技术合作的合作倡议进行评估。该评估应描述合作的性质,包括资助、参与者以及结果;详述有关措施所依据的许可及规管制度;考虑美国研究人员和公司的知识产权是否得到充分保护;研究中国国有企业或军队是否从美国纳税人资助的研究中受益;调查参与合作的中国研究人员是否与中国政府或军方有联系;调查参与美国政府主导的美中合作项目的任何美国公司、大学或实验室是否受到源自中国的网络渗透;并评估这种合作对美国的好处。此外,这一评估还应调查由政府主导的美中合作项目是否存在浪费现象,如果有的话,并提出改进合作的建议。

中国的农业政策:贸易、投资、安全和创新

Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation.

The Commission recommends:

中国的农业政策:贸易、投资、安全和创新

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech reviewand approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry.As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with theOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative to seek bilateral or multilateralmeasures, as appropriate, to address these impacts.

The Commission recommends:

美国国会指示美国农业部查明中国对农产品的非同步生物技术审查和批准制度对美国工业的不利影响程度。作为审查的一部分,美国农业部应与美国贸易代表办公室合作,寻求适当的双边或多边措施,以解决这些影响。

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech reviewand approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry.As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with theOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative to seek bilateral or multilateralmeasures, as appropriate, to address these impacts.
  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, toprepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China onfood safety, inspection, mechanisms foraddressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistanceprovided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime.

美国国会指示美国农业部查明中国对农产品的非同步生物技术审查和批准制度对美国工业的不利影响程度。作为审查的一部分,美国农业部应与美国贸易代表办公室合作,寻求适当的双边或多边措施,以解决这些影响。

国会指示美国农业部与美国食品和药物管理局合作,就其与中国在食品安全、检验、卫生和植物卫生问题处理机制方面的技术接触,以及为改进其食品安全检验制度而向中国提供的任何技术援助,编制一份年度报告。

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, toprepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China onfood safety, inspection, mechanisms foraddressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistanceprovided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime.

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations

国会指示美国农业部与美国食品和药物管理局合作,就其与中国在食品安全、检验、卫生和植物卫生问题处理机制方面的技术接触,以及为改进其食品安全检验制度而向中国提供的任何技术援助,编制一份年度报告。

美中安全关系

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations

Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States.

美中安全关系

中国的军事改组和现代化:对美国的启示

Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States.

The Commission recommends:

中国的军事改组和现代化:对美国的启示

委员会建议

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committeesof jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, assessinghow the change in the China Coast Guard’scommand structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that itreports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss theimplications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as acoercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. Thisreport should also determinehow this change may affect U.S. Navy andU.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether thelatter should be designated as a military force.

委员会建议

国会指示美国国防部和美国国土安全部,向有关权力部门提供报告,评估中国海警指挥机构的变动——直接向中央军事委员会报告——对其执法地位的影响。报告应讨论这种变化对中国在东海和南海“灰色地带”活动中使用海上保安厅作为强制性工具的影响。本报告还应确定这一变化可能如何影响美国海军和美国海岸警卫队与中国海岸警卫队的互动,以及中国海岸警卫队是否应被指定为一支军事力量。

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committeesof jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, assessinghow the change in the China Coast Guard’scommand structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that itreports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss theimplications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as acoercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. Thisreport should also determinehow this change may affect U.S. Navy andU.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether thelatter should be designated as a military force.
  1. Congress consider imposing sanctions onkey Chinese state-owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoingmilitarization of the South China Sea.

国会指示美国国防部和美国国土安全部,向有关权力部门提供报告,评估中国海警指挥机构的变动——直接向中央军事委员会报告——对其执法地位的影响。报告应讨论这种变化对中国在东海和南海“灰色地带”活动中使用海上保安厅作为强制性工具的影响。本报告还应确定这一变化可能如何影响美国海军和美国海岸警卫队与中国海岸警卫队的互动,以及中国海岸警卫队是否应被指定为一支军事力量。

美国国会考虑对参与中国南海军事化进程的关键国有企业和个人实施制裁。

  1. Congress consider imposing sanctions onkey Chinese state-owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoingmilitarization of the South China Sea.

Chapter 3: China and the World

美国国会考虑对参与中国南海军事化进程的关键国有企业和个人实施制裁。

中国与世界

Chapter 3: China and the World

Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative

中国与世界

The Commission recommends:

Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative

委员会建议

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of orvulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in theIndo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure,and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainabledevelopment, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law,respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and themedia.

委员会建议

美国国会设立了一个基金,为那些受到中国经济或外交压力的,或容易受到中国经济或外交压力影响的国家,特别是在印太地区,提供额外的双边援助。该基金应用于促进数字连接、基础设施和能源获取。该基金还可用于促进可持续发展、打击腐败、提高透明度、改善法治、应对人道主义危机以及建设公民社会和媒体的能力。

  1. Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of orvulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in theIndo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure,and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainabledevelopment, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law,respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and themedia.
  1. Congress require the U.S. Department ofState to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide analternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt andRoad Initiative . Such a report should also examine where BRI projectsfail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI andChina’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting ofits human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

美国国会设立了一个基金,为那些受到中国经济或外交压力的,或容易受到中国经济或外交压力影响的国家,特别是在印太地区,提供额外的双边援助。该基金应用于促进数字连接、基础设施和能源获取。该基金还可用于促进可持续发展、打击腐败、提高透明度、改善法治、应对人道主义危机以及建设公民社会和媒体的能力。

美国国会要求美国国务院就其正在采取的行动向国会提交一份报告,提供另一种基于事实的叙述,以对抗中国在“一带一路”倡议中传递的信息。此类报告还应审查“一带一路”项目在哪些方面不符合国际标准,并突出“一带一路”与中国试图掩盖新疆维吾尔族人权侵犯信息和歪曲报道之间的联系。

  1. Congress require the U.S. Department ofState to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide analternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt andRoad Initiative . Such a report should also examine where BRI projectsfail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI andChina’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting ofits human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
  1. Congress require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate , with aclassified annex, that details the impact of basing facilities along the Beltand Road on freedom of navigation and sea control, both in peacetime and duringa conflict. The NIE should cover the impact on U.S., allied, and regionalpolitical and security interests.

美国国会要求美国国务院就其正在采取的行动向国会提交一份报告,提供另一种基于事实的叙述,以对抗中国在“一带一路”倡议中传递的信息。此类报告还应审查“一带一路”项目在哪些方面不符合国际标准,并突出“一带一路”与中国试图掩盖新疆维吾尔族人权侵犯信息和歪曲报道之间的联系。

美国国会要求国家情报机关出具一份国家情报评估报告(NationalIntelligence Estimate, NIE),并附上一份机密附件,详细说明在和平时期和冲突时期,中国将“一带一路”沿线的设施建立在航行自由和海上控制基础上的影响。国家情报评估报告应该涵盖对美国、美国的盟国和地区的政治与安全利益。

  1. Congress require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate , with aclassified annex, that details the impact of basing facilities along the Beltand Road on freedom of navigation and sea control, both in peacetime and duringa conflict. The NIE should cover the impact on U.S., allied, and regionalpolitical and security interests.

图片 5

美国国会要求国家情报机关出具一份国家情报评估报告(NationalIntelligence Estimate, NIE),并附上一份机密附件,详细说明在和平时期和冲突时期,中国将“一带一路”沿线的设施建立在航行自由和海上控制基础上的影响。国家情报评估报告应该涵盖对美国、美国的盟国和地区的政治与安全利益。

Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S.Allies and Partners

图片 6

中国与美国盟友与伙伴的关系

Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S.Allies and Partners

The Commission recommends:

中国与美国盟友与伙伴的关系

委员会建议

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress direct the Administration tostrengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners inEurope and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests andpolicies pertaining to China, including through the following measures:

委员会建议

国会指示政府加强美国及其在欧洲和印度-太平洋地区的盟友和伙伴在与中国有关的共同经济和安全利益及政策方面的合作,包括通过以下措施:

  1. Congress direct the Administration tostrengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners inEurope and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests andpolicies pertaining to China, including through the following measures:

• Urge the Administration to engage inregular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development ofcommon standards for screening mechanisms.

国会指示政府加强美国及其在欧洲和印度-太平洋地区的盟友和伙伴在与中国有关的共同经济和安全利益及政策方面的合作,包括通过以下措施:

敦促政府对中国投资活动进行定期信息共享和联合监测,并就涉及国家安全的外国投资筛选工作分享最佳做法,包括制定筛选机制的共同标准。

• Urge the Administration to engage inregular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development ofcommon standards for screening mechanisms.

• Enhance consultations on mitigating theexport of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

敦促政府对中国投资活动进行定期信息共享和联合监测,并就涉及国家安全的外国投资筛选工作分享最佳做法,包括制定筛选机制的共同标准。

加强在减少向中国出口军民两用技术和确定对国家安全至关重要的其他基础技术方面的磋商。

• Enhance consultations on mitigating theexport of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofJustice to:

加强在减少向中国出口军民两用技术和确定对国家安全至关重要的其他基础技术方面的磋商。

国会指示美国司法部

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofJustice to:

• Examine the application of current U.S.laws, including the “Conspiracy against Rights” law, toprosecuting Chinese Communist Party affiliates who threaten, coerce, orotherwise intimidate U.S. residents.

国会指示美国司法部

审查现行美国法律的适用情况,包括反阴谋法,以起诉威胁、胁迫或以其他方式恐吓美国居民的中国共产党附属机构。

• Examine the application of current U.S.laws, including the “Conspiracy against Rights” law, toprosecuting Chinese Communist Party affiliates who threaten, coerce, orotherwise intimidate U.S. residents.

• Clarify that labels required by theForeign Agents Registration Act on informational materials disseminated onbehalf of foreign principals, such as China Daily, must appear prominently atthe top of the first page of such materials.

审查现行美国法律的适用情况,包括反阴谋法,以起诉威胁、胁迫或以其他方式恐吓美国居民的中国共产党附属机构。

明确《外国代理登记法》对代表外国委托人传播的信息材料的标签,必须出现在这种材料首页上的显着位置。

• Clarify that labels required by theForeign Agents Registration Act on informational materials disseminated onbehalf of foreign principals, such as China Daily, must appear prominently atthe top of the first page of such materials.

  1. Congress direct the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce an unclassified annualreport, with a classified annex, on the Chinese Communist Party’s influence andpropaganda activities in the United States.

明确《外国代理登记法》对代表外国委托人传播的信息材料的标签,必须出现在这种材料首页上的显着位置。

美国国会指示美国国家反间谍和安全中心编制一份非机密年度报告,其中包含一份机密附件,内容涉及CCP在美国的影响力和宣传活动。

  1. Congress direct the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce an unclassified annualreport, with a classified annex, on the Chinese Communist Party’s influence andpropaganda activities in the United States.
  1. Congress direct the Administration todiscuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO canpromote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia.

美国国会指示美国国家反间谍和安全中心编制一份非机密年度报告,其中包含一份机密附件,内容涉及CCP在美国的影响力和宣传活动。

美国国会指示政府在与欧盟打交道时,讨论中国与俄罗斯日益密切的军事关系以及对跨大西洋安全利益日益重要的影响,这些讨论将包括欧洲和北约如何促进就共同防御以及中国和俄罗斯提出的其他挑战交换信息。

  1. Congress direct the Administration todiscuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO canpromote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia.

Section 3: China and Taiwan

美国国会指示政府在与欧盟打交道时,讨论中国与俄罗斯日益密切的军事关系以及对跨大西洋安全利益日益重要的影响,这些讨论将包括欧洲和北约如何促进就共同防御以及中国和俄罗斯提出的其他挑战交换信息。

中国与台湾

Section 3: China and Taiwan

The Commission recommends:

中国与台湾

委员会建议

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade andInvestment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating proceduresto resolve outstanding issues.

委员会建议

国会指示美国贸易代表办公室在美国国会授权下,重新开始2019年的《美台贸易投资框架协议》会议,并确定更高级的谈判程序,以解决悬而未决的问题。

  1. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade andInvestment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating proceduresto resolve outstanding issues.
  1. Congress direct the Administration toproduce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supportingTaiwan’s engagement with the international community, including considerationof, but not limited to, the following actions:

国会指示美国贸易代表办公室在美国国会授权下,重新开始2019年的《美台贸易投资框架协议》会议,并确定更高级的谈判程序,以解决悬而未决的问题。

美国国会指示政府就支持台湾参与国际社会的整体策略编制一份跨部门报告,包括考虑但不限于下列行动:

  1. Congress direct the Administration toproduce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supportingTaiwan’s engagement with the international community, including considerationof, but not limited to, the following actions:

• Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partnersin an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei.

美国国会指示政府就支持台湾参与国际社会的整体策略编制一份跨部门报告,包括考虑但不限于下列行动:

探索向台湾的外交伙伴提供积极发展和安全援助的机会,以鼓励他们与台北保持联系。

• Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partnersin an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei.

•• Identify adjustments the United Statescould take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering thecross- Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei.

探索向台湾的外交伙伴提供积极发展和安全援助的机会,以鼓励他们与台北保持联系。

找出美国可以与台湾关系做出的调整,以回应北京改变两岸现状并采取胁迫行动以向台湾施压。

•• Identify adjustments the United Statescould take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering thecross- Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei.

• Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S.policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments andsupport an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries.

找出美国可以与台湾关系做出的调整,以回应北京改变两岸现状并采取胁迫行动以向台湾施压。

在与美国的盟国和伙伴政府的会议上讨论两岸关系和美国对台政策,支持扩大台湾与这些国家间的商业、文化和其他交流。

• Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S.policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments andsupport an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries.

• Establish a high-level bilateralU.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.

在与美国的盟国和伙伴政府的会议上讨论两岸关系和美国对台政策,支持扩大台湾与这些国家间的商业、文化和其他交流。

建立高级别双边关系,支持台湾在促进全球可持续发展方面发挥作用。

• Establish a high-level bilateralU.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.

  1. Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibitU.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan.Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S.companies.

建立高级别双边关系,支持台湾在促进全球可持续发展方面发挥作用。

美国国会考虑根据《出口管理法》,修改反抵制法,或通过新的立法,禁止美国公司服从中国对台湾施加压力的努力。这类立法可能包括授权在中国政府报复美国公司的情况下对中国实体实施对等制裁的措施。

  1. Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibitU.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan.Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S.companies.
  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Conceptand take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observersin U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuantto the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwanwith the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies.

美国国会考虑根据《出口管理法》,修改反抵制法,或通过新的立法,禁止美国公司服从中国对台湾施加压力的努力。这类立法可能包括授权在中国政府报复美国公司的情况下对中国实体实施对等制裁的措施。

美国国会指示美国国防部支持实施台湾新的整体防御理念,并采取行动支持台湾保持足够的自卫能力,将台湾军事人员作为参与者或观察员,包括在美国和美国领导的多边军事演习中;根据《台湾旅游法》,定期进行军事规划和其他咨询人员的高层交往;并考虑协助台湾创造性地获取关键防务用品的可能性,包括通过美国和台湾公司之间的防务技术合作。

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Conceptand take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observersin U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuantto the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwanwith the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies.
  1. Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services toTaiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement toprovide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existingcapabilities.

美国国会指示美国国防部支持实施台湾新的整体防御理念,并采取行动支持台湾保持足够的自卫能力,将台湾军事人员作为参与者或观察员,包括在美国和美国领导的多边军事演习中;根据《台湾旅游法》,定期进行军事规划和其他咨询人员的高层交往;并考虑协助台湾创造性地获取关键防务用品的可能性,包括通过美国和台湾公司之间的防务技术合作。

美国国会考虑提高向美国主要盟国对台出售防务用品和服务的通报门槛,并终止对台湾现有军事设备进行维修或维护进行通报的任何要求。

  1. Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services toTaiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement toprovide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existingcapabilities.
  1. Congress express support for the TsaiAdministration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

美国国会考虑提高向美国主要盟国对台出售防务用品和服务的通报门槛,并终止对台湾现有军事设备进行维修或维护进行通报的任何要求。

美国国会对蔡英文政府维持台湾海峡现状的做法表示支持。

  1. Congress express support for the TsaiAdministration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

图片 7

美国国会对蔡英文政府维持台湾海峡现状的做法表示支持。

Section 5: China’s Evolving North KoreaStrategy

图片 8

中国对朝鲜战略的演变

Section 5: China’s Evolving North KoreaStrategy

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a report within 180 days on the current state ofChinese enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. A classified annex shouldprovide a list of Chinese financial institutions, businesses, and officials involved in trading with North Korea that could be subject to future sanctions,and should explain the potential broader impacts of sanctioning those entities.

中国对朝鲜战略的演变

美国国会指示美国财政部在180天内就中国对朝鲜实施制裁的现状提交一份报告,并附一份机密附件,列出与朝鲜进行贸易的中国金融机构、企业和官员名单,这些机构、企业和官员未来可能会受到制裁,并应解释制裁这些实体可能产生的更广泛影响。

  1. Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a report within 180 days on the current state ofChinese enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. A classified annex shouldprovide a list of Chinese financial institutions, businesses, and officials involved in trading with North Korea that could be subject to future sanctions,and should explain the potential broader impacts of sanctioning those entities.

Chapter 4: China’s High-Tech Development

美国国会指示美国财政部在180天内就中国对朝鲜实施制裁的现状提交一份报告,并附一份机密附件,列出与朝鲜进行贸易的中国金融机构、企业和官员名单,这些机构、企业和官员未来可能会受到制裁,并应解释制裁这些实体可能产生的更广泛影响。

中国的高科技发展

Chapter 4: China’s High-Tech Development

The Commission recommends:

中国的高科技发展

委员会建议

The Commission recommends:

  1. Congress require the Office of Management and Budget’s Federal Chief Information Security Officer Council toprepare an annual report to Congress to ensure supply chain vulnerabilities from China are adequately addressed. This report should collect and assess:

委员会建议

国会要求管理和预算办公室的联邦首席信息安全委员会向国会提交一份年度报告,以确保来自中国的供应链漏洞得到充分解决。本报告应收集和评估:

  1. Congress require the Office of Management and Budget’s Federal Chief Information Security Officer Council toprepare an annual report to Congress to ensure supply chain vulnerabilities from China are adequately addressed. This report should collect and assess:

• Each agency’s plans for supply chainrisk management and assessments;

国会要求管理和预算办公室的联邦首席信息安全委员会向国会提交一份年度报告,以确保来自中国的供应链漏洞得到充分解决。本报告应收集和评估:

每个机构的供应链风险管理和评估计划;

• Each agency’s plans for supply chainrisk management and assessments;

• Existing departmental procurement andsecurity policies and guidance on cybersecurity, operations security, physicalsecurity, information security and data security that may affect informationand communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices; and

每个机构的供应链风险管理和评估计划;

现有的可能影响信息通信技术、5G网络和物联网设备的网络安全、运营安全、物理安全、信息安全和数据安全方面的部门采购、安全政策和指导方针;

• Existing departmental procurement andsecurity policies and guidance on cybersecurity, operations security, physicalsecurity, information security and data security that may affect informationand communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices; and

• Areas where new policies and guidancemay be needed—including for specific information and communications technology,5G networks, and Internet of Things devices, applications, or procedures—andwhere existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address supply chain, cyber, operations, physical, information, and data securityvulnerabilities.

现有的可能影响信息通信技术、5G网络和物联网设备的网络安全、运营安全、物理安全、信息安全和数据安全方面的部门采购、安全政策和指导方针;

指出哪些领域需要新的政策和指导方案——包括特定的信息和通信技术、5G网络、物联网设备、应用程序或流程——以及哪些领域现有的安全政策和指导方案可以更新,以解决供应链、网络、运营、物理、信息和数据安全漏洞。

• Areas where new policies and guidancemay be needed—including for specific information and communications technology,5G networks, and Internet of Things devices, applications, or procedures—andwhere existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address supply chain, cyber, operations, physical, information, and data securityvulnerabilities.

  1. Congress direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to identify steps to ensure the rapid and secure deployment of a5G network, with a particular focus on the threat posed by equipment andservices designed or manufactured in China; and whether any new statutoryauthorities are required to ensure the security of domestic 5G networks.

指出哪些领域需要新的政策和指导方案——包括特定的信息和通信技术、5G网络、物联网设备、应用程序或流程——以及哪些领域现有的安全政策和指导方案可以更新,以解决供应链、网络、运营、物理、信息和数据安全漏洞。

美国国会指示美国国家电信和信息管理局和联邦通信委员会确定:确保5G网络的快速和安全部署的步骤,特别关注在中国设计或制造的设备和服务带来的威胁;是否需要新的法定机构来保障国内5G网络的安全。

  1. Congress direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to identify steps to ensure the rapid and secure deployment of a5G network, with a particular focus on the threat posed by equipment andservices designed or manufactured in China; and whether any new statutoryauthorities are required to ensure the security of domestic 5G networks.

图片 9

美国国会指示美国国家电信和信息管理局和联邦通信委员会确定:确保5G网络的快速和安全部署的步骤,特别关注在中国设计或制造的设备和服务带来的威胁;是否需要新的法定机构来保障国内5G网络的安全。

图片 10

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